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Most studies measuring asymmetric adjustments in vertical price transmissions fail to provide 
empirical support to explain such behavior. The literature invokes theoretical models, which 
derive asymmetric behavior based on variables that are difficult to measure such as oligopolies' 
coordination policies, market imperfections or menu costs. Therefore, with no empirical support 
explaining the asymmetries, these studies leave no room for policy implementation. In this paper 
I relate asymmetric price responses to a theory of behavior under risk driven by the perishable 
rate of the goods. Retailers of a perishable good facing an increment in the wholesale price may 
decide not to increase their prices for fear of being left with a spoiled product. Using three 
agricultural products with different perishable rates I reject the null hypothesis of symmetric 
adjustments in the most perishable product but fail to reject for the less perishable goods. The 
nonlinear responses are consistent with the prediction of the model. The test for asymmetries uses 
a threshold cointegration technique where the threshold level and the cointegration vector are 
estimated from the data instead of being imposed by the econometrician.  
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1.  Introduction 
Do prices rise faster than they fall? In the last twenty years several studies (as well 
as the general public
1 and governmental offices
2) have tried to answer this question. 
Focusing on the vertical transmission of prices from producers to retailers or from 
wholesalers to retailers, these studies cover a vast number of industries and countries. For 
example, Borenstein, et al (1997) study how gasoline prices in U.S. cities respond to 
international crude oil prices. Eckert (2002) conducts a similar study for Canada. 
Palaskas (1995) focused on the price transmission of agricultural products within the 
European Union. The recent article by Peltzman (2000) takes these studies to the limit. 
He tries to answer the above question analyzing 242 products in the U.S. He claims that 
the answer is yes: output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases. 
Therefore, he argues, the adjustments are asymmetric. 
However, it is not clear in the literature what causes these asymmetries. Most of the 
papers present a variety of possible arguments but no evidence to support it. The 
arguments include search cost with locally imperfect market (Blinder et.al. 1998), trigger 
price models of oligopolistic coordination (Borenstein et.al. 1997) as well as menu costs 
(e.g. Azzam 1999; Blinder 1982)
3. One of the reasons for the lack of empirical support 
for these theories is the difficulty to measure variables such as the coordination 
mechanism of oligopolies (assuming we can identify the oligopoly firms) or the extent of 
                                                 
1 On January 9, 1999 the following headline appeared in The New York Times "The Great Pork Gap: Hog 
Prices Have Plummeted. Why Haven't Store Prices?" cited by Peltzman (2000). 
2 The United States Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 directs the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
measure, analyze, and disseminate farm-to-retail price spread data according to the 7 U. S. Code 1622(b)
2. 
This Act motivated a stream of papers analyzing price spread (see Hahn, 1990). 
3 For an extensive discussion of other models generating asymmetric price transmissions see Cramon-
Taubadel (1998)   3
the menu costs. In fact, when proxies for those variables were included in a regression to 
explain the degree of asymmetric responses of retail prices, the results show no statistical 
significance (Peltzman 2000). The major problem is that when evidence of asymmetric 
behavior is found but it is not possible to isolate or identify the causes of such behavior, 
we leave no room for policies to correct these asymmetries. 
Ward (1982) presented an alternative explanation for asymmetric price adjustments 
based on behavior under risk. He argues that retailers of perishable goods may decide not 
to increase their prices for fear of being left with a spoiled product. For instance, when 
wholesale prices increase we should expect a less than proportional increment in retail 
prices, or a lagged increment, or maybe no changes at all. When, on the other hand, 
wholesale price, decrease, we should expect a faster or bigger reduction, creating an 
asymmetric adjustment. The perishability of a product is much easier to measure than the 
variables mentioned above. It is clear that with no refrigeration, a tomato will spoil faster 
than rice. This variable (the perishable rate of the product) was not included in the 
regression estimated by Peltzman. However, in the U.S. most of the retailers have access 
to refrigeration systems, reducing the spoil rate of products which could probably reduce 
the chances of having a significant impact on Peltzman's regression. 
This is not the case in poor countries. In Peru, for example, most of the food for 
consumption is purchased fresh at street markets where there is almost no refrigeration. It 
is possible then to test for asymmetric price adjustments of agricultural products and 
relate the potential variation in asymmetric adjustments with the different perishable rates 
of these products. This is the objective of this paper.    4
This paper has three contributions to the literature testing for asymmetric price 
adjustments. First, I use data from Lima, the capital of Peru, for three agricultural 
products with different perishable rates: tomatoes, potatoes and rice. I focused on the 
wholesale to retail price adjustments and explore whether the existence of asymmetric 
adjustments are related to the perishability of these products. My findings provide 
empirical support to Ward's hypothesis. I found evidence of asymmetric price 
adjustments in tomatoes but not in rice or potato. 
Second, the high perishable rate of tomatoes requires the use of high frequency 
data. I use a new released dataset, collected by the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture, 
which includes daily prices from January 1, 1995 to July 18, 2001.  The use of daily data 
allows me to capture a more accurate relation between wholesale and retail prices. 
Third, this article uses a recent methodology developed to test for threshold 
cointegration where the threshold is estimated from the data instead of being imposed by 
the econometrician. Recent studies have shown that traditional approaches to test for 
asymmetric adjustments are inadequate because they do not take into account the 
cointegration or long run relation between wholesale and retail prices. Abdulai (2002) 
proposed to use the method described by Enders and Granger (1998) and he applies it to 
test for asymmetries in the Swiss pork market. Threshold cointegration methods allow us 
to test whether "increases in producer prices that lead to declines in marketing margins 
are passed more quickly to retail prices than decreases in producer prices that result in 
increases in the marketing margins." (Abdulai 2002, p. 679.) However, Enders and 
Granger (1998) assume that the cointegration vector and the threshold level are known by   5
the econometrician. Instead, I used the estimation proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002) 
that allows for an estimation of both parameters from the data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the 
econometric methods comparing Enders and Granger (1998) and Hansen and Seo (2002). 
Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4 shows that when the 
cointegration vector and the threshold parameter are estimated from the data I found 
evidence rejecting the hypothesis of symmetric adjustments in high perishable products 
(tomatoes) but the test fails to the reject it in long lasting products (such as potatoes and 
rice). The conclusions and possible extensions of the paper are discussed in section 5.  
2.  Measuring asymmetric price transmissions 
Several studies attempting to measure asymmetric price transmission focused on the 
estimation of the following reduced form equation: 
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where ∆x1t and ∆x2t represent changes in retail and wholesale prices, respectively, and dt 
is an indicator function that is equal to one when a variable zt does not exceed the 
threshold  parameter γ. Usually authors set zt=∆x2t-1 and γ=0. In this case they want to test 
if the response of retail prices differs depending on whether wholesale prices increase or 
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Equation (1) and this test are used, for example, in Peltzman (2000).   6
This equation assumes that changes in retail prices are not affected by their past 
values. It also assumes that the causality (Granger's sense) goes from wholesale to retail 
prices only. It is possible, however, to test for both restrictions using a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) instead. However, as some authors have noticed
4, when xt = 
(x1t x2t) is a I(1) time series with a cointegration vector β, then the use of equation (1) to 
test for asymmetric price responses is not adequate. The existence of a cointegration 
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This equation is called a vector error-correction model (VECM) where wt is 
defined as "the deviations from the long run equilibrium", with the vector-parameter π1 
measuring the adjustments to the long run equilibrium. As stated in equation (3) these 
adjustments are linear. Balke and Fomby (1997) present a model that allows for a non-
linear adjustment to the long run equilibrium by introducing the concept of threshold 
cointegration. The presence of threshold cointegration will alter equation (3) in order to 
allow for two regimes: 
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As before, dt is an indicator function that defines the different regimes. The goal of 
this paper is to test for asymmetric price transmission using the threshold cointegration 
                                                 
4 See von Cramon-Taubadel (1998).   7
techniques. At least two different approaches have been proposed to estimate equation (4) 
and they differ on their assumption about the knowledge the econometrician has on the 
cointegration vector β and the regime threshold parameter γ. The methods I will present 
below allow zt to be equal to wt-1 or ∆x2t-1. I will consider only the case of zt=wt-1 for ease 
of exposition
5. 
The first approach was introduced by Enders and Granger (1998) and it is used by 
Abdulai (2002) to test for asymmetric price transmission
6. This methodology assumes 
that the cointegration vector β and the threshold parameter γ are both known by the 
econometrician. They also assume that π21i=π22i for all i=1,…,I. This means that only the 
adjustments to the equilibrium change with the regimes while the autoregressive 
parameters of equation (4) remain constant. 
To test for threshold models Enders and Granger (1998) propose the following steps 
given that β is known and setting γ=0: 
Step 1: Regress wt against a constant and/or a trend if necessary. The authors suggest the 
inclusion of a trend when "the data may have a clear trend" (p. 307). Let µt be the 
residuals of this regression. 
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Step 3: Using an F-test, evaluate the null hypothesis that µt is a random walk process by 
testing ρ1=ρ2=0. The authors presented critical values to evaluate this hypothesis. 
                                                 
5 Enders and Granger (1998) call the process a momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) when 
zt=∆x2t-1. Hansen and Seo (2002) say that this case is possible to be developed with their methodology but 
they focus only on zt=wt-1. 
6 Strictly speaking, Enders and Granger do not use the term threshold cointegration. They talk about 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) models.   8
Step 4: If the null hypothesis is rejected, test the restriction that the adjustments are 
symmetries (the null hypothesis ρ1=ρ2) using the usual F statistic. Enders and 
Granger suggest performing some diagnostic tests to assure that the estimate of ξt is 
correctly characterized as a white noise process. If not, they suggested repeating 
Step 2 using J+1 lags instead of J. 
Step 5: If the null hypothesis of symmetry is rejected then estimate a VECM as defined in 
equation (4) imposing π21i=π22i for all i=1,…,I as mentioned above. 
Step 6: Evaluate the null hypothesis of symmetric price responses by testing π11=π12 using 
the likelihood ratio test. When this equality is true, adjustments to the long run 
equilibrium are the same whether the deviations from the long run equilibrium were 
positive or negative. If the null hypothesis is rejected there is evidence of 
asymmetric price responses. 
The other approach to test for threshold cointegration is developed by Hansen and 
Seo (2002). Their methodology assumes β and γ are unknown parameters. Both 
parameters are estimated from the data. They do not impose the restriction that π21i=π22i 
for all i=1,…,I. Therefore their proposed VECM is exactly the one described in equation 
(4) with zt=wt-1. They note that when β and γ are known the matrix-parameter π in (4) as 
well as the matrix Σ=E(εtεt') can be estimated applying OLS to each price equation in (4). 
So they propose the following algorithm (Hansen and Seo 2002, p. 299): 
Step I: Form a grid on [γL,γU] and [βL,βU] based on linear estimates of β
7 and the 
restriction that θ0≤Prob(wt-1≤γ)≤1-θ0, where θ0>0 is an arbitrary trimming parameter. 
                                                 
7 They proposed the used of any consistent estimate of β, for example using Johansen MLE.   9
Step II: For each value of (β,γ) on those grids compute  ˆ(,) π βγ and  ˆ(,) . β γ Σ  Note that 
both sets of estimated parameters are functions of (β,γ). 
Step III: Find ( ˆ ˆ , β γ ) as the values of (β,γ) that minimizes the value of log| ˆ(,) β γ Σ | which 
is the likelihood function after Step II. 
Step IV: Set  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ (,) , (,) β γππ β γ Σ=Σ =  as the final estimated parameters including ( ˆ ˆ , β γ ). 
The advantage of this methodology is that (β,γ) are estimated from the data, not just 
assumed by the econometrician. The problem, however, is that Hansen and Seo (2002) do 
not provide a proof of consistency nor a distribution theory for the maximum likelihood 
estimation they proposed (p. 294). However they do provide the asymptotic null 
distribution of the Sup-LM test to evaluate the hypothesis of threshold cointegration and 
they also present two methods to calculate the p-values for the test (p. 301-305). If the 
null hypothesis of no threshold effect is rejected then: 
Step V: Test for the null hypothesis of symmetric price adjustments (π11=π12). If rejected 
there will be evidence of asymmetric price transmission between retail and 
wholesale prices. 
In this paper I test for asymmetric price responses comparing both methodologies 
described above. Note that under these two methodologies the test is no longer whether 
retail prices react similarly to any positive or negative changes in wholesale prices as 
defined in equation (2). The test for asymmetric price transmission now is whether retail 
prices react different to positive or negative deviation from the long run equilibrium. This 
is the adequate measure when the series are integrated of degree one and have a   10
cointegration vector. The data used to test for prices transmission is described in the next 
section 
3.  Data 
The data used in this paper comes from the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture 
(MINAG). Starting in January 1995 the MINAG put together a dataset that included retail 
and wholesale prices in 28 cities nationwide. In each city, an array of 52 agricultural 
products was included
8. The original intention of the MINAG was to have a daily dataset 
for retail and wholesale prices for each of the 52 products in each of the 28 cities. This is 
a major goal for datasets collection in a poor country such as Peru. 
Unfortunately, because the collection of information was administrated by local 
agencies of the MINAG, the quality of the data changes from city to city. In some of the 
cities visits to markets were not performed daily. It is because of this and by 
parsimonious reasons that I focus on only one city: Lima. Lima is the capital of Peru, 
harboring at least a third of the economic activity and is the first city in terms of 
population. The city of Lima also presents the lowest rate of missing data. In the years 
covered in this paper weekends alone (without including holidays) represent around 29% 
of the observations. The data available in Lima for the products included in this paper has 
less than 23% of the total number of observations lost because of missing data. 
As discussed in the introduction, one goal of this paper is to evaluate if the 
existence of possible asymmetries are related to perishable rates. For these reason I used 
three products that have different perishable rates: tomatoes, potatoes and rice. It is 
                                                 
8 The complete list of cities and products is available upon request. For access to the complete dataset 
please contact Javier Escobal at the Group of Analysis for Development (http://www.grade.org.pe).   11
important to note that most of the food traded for consumption in Peru is fresh with 
almost no refrigeration. Thus, while rice can be stored in order to speculate with the 
price, such an action will be riskier in the case of tomatoes when there is no refrigeration 
available. 
The sample used in this paper contains retail and wholesale prices of tomato, 
potatoes and rice in the city of Lima. The data is daily from January 1, 1995 to July 18, 
2001. Table 1 presents the basic statistics of the data. From this table and Figure 1 we can 
observe that tomatoes are the product with the highest volatility in both retail and 
wholesale prices, while the rice has the lowest. Table 2 presents two definitions of 
spread. First the (absolute) spread is equal to the difference between the retail and 
wholesale price. Second, the relative spread is equal to the absolute spread divided by the 
wholesale price multiplied by 100. The results of Table 2 show that the difference in 
volatility coincides with differences in spreads. Thus, rice has the lowest spread in 
absolute and relative terms while tomatoes present the highest. Potatoes prices are 
somewhere in the middle for both indicators. In the next section I use the data described 
here to test for asymmetric price transmission using the methods described in section 3.  
Table 1
Basic Statistics: 1995-2001
(Prices per Kilogram in Nuevos Soles)
Missing Coefficient
Product Type N values (%) Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum of variability
Tomatoes Wholesale 1850 22.6 0.93 0.40 0.25 2.58 42.8
Retail 1850 22.6 1.68 0.58 0.50 4.00 34.8
Potatoes Wholesale 1882 21.3 0.59 0.24 0.21 1.82 41.4
Retail 1882 21.3 0.92 0.29 0.46 2.33 31.1
Rice Wholesale 1850 22.6 1.35 0.24 0.86 1.95 18.0
Retail 1850 22.6 1.78 0.32 1.07 2.50 18.2
Note: Between 1995 and 2001 the average exchange rate was US $1=2.92 Nuevos Soles
Coefficient of variability = Std. Dev/Mean x 100    12
 
Table 2
Spreads by products: 1995-2001
(Prices per Kilogram in Nuevos Soles)
Relative
Product Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Spread (%)  
2/
Tomatoes 0.75 0.27 0.04 2.03 88.4
Potatoes 0.33 0.09 0.10 0.75 64.4
Rice 0.43 0.16 0.13 0.91 32.5
1/ Retail minus wholesale price
2/ Absolute spread divided by wholesale price x 100.
Note: Between 1995 and 2001 the average exchange rate was US $1=2.92 Nuevos Soles

























Figure 1. Evolution of Prices: 1995-2001
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4.  Results
9 
As described above, the major problem with the traditional methodology described 
in equations (1) and (2) to test for asymmetric price responses occurs when the retail and 
wholesale prices are integrated of order one. The first step, then, is to test for the presence 
of unit root process in each of the six variables under analysis. 
To perform this test I used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic selecting 
the autoregressive lags by minimizing the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria (AIC 
and BIC, respectively). The test was performed in three different ways, but always 
including a constant. In the first case a trend was added, in the second case eleven 
dummy variables were included to account for seasonal effects; and in the third case a 
trend and the seasonal dummies were included. In all cases the test failed to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root. I also found that in all cases the ADF test rejected the null 
hypothesis that the first differences of the variables follow a unit root process, so all the 
variables are integrated of degree one only. I also test if the vector β=[1,-1] is a 
cointegration vector using the Engle and Granger (1987) approach. For all the three 
products I reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. It is important to keep in mind 
that throughout all the paper I define x1t as the retail price and x2t as the wholesale price, 
therefore, β=[1,-1] is a cointegration vector meaning the (absolute) spread is stationary. 
The results of the unit root and cointegration tests are not reported here to save space but 
are available upon request.  
                                                 
9 In developing the code to perform the test described in Hansen and Seo (2002) I benefit from the authors ' 
generosity to make their Gauss code publicly available. Their code can be downloaded from 
http://www.ssc.eisc.edu/~bhansen   14
An important element of this series is the seasonality they present. When each 
variable was regressed against a constant an eleven seasonal dummies I reject the null 
hypothesis that the dummy variables are jointly equal to zero
10. Therefore, I test for 
asymmetric adjustment using the seasonally-adjusted data, that is, the residual of the 
above regression. 
I present now the results of applying the method of Enders and Granger (1998). 
Table 3 follows the steps described in section 2. As previously discussed this procedure 
takes wt -the deviation from the long run equilibrium- as given. I first estimated the 
cointegration vector β using Engle-Granger two-step estimator. I call this Step 0. Step 1 
was not necessary in this case.  
As shown in Step 3, for all products the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
(ρ1=ρ2=0) is rejected. Step 4.1 strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no threshold 
cointegration (ρ1=ρ2) in the case of potatoes and rice but fails to reject in the most 
perishable product in the sample: tomatoes
11. These results contradict Ward's argument 
that the most perishable products will display more asymmetric adjustments. However, I 
obtained the opposite results –asymmetries in the most perishable goods- when the 
threshold parameter is not imposed but estimated using Hansen and Seo (2002). 
                                                 
10 The results of the tests are reported in table A.1 in the appendix. 
11 As display in Step 4.2, diagnostic tests over the residuals show no evidence against a white noise process 
using the Ljung-Box statistics as recommended by the authors.   15
Table 3
Tests for threshold cointegration: Enders-Granger
Step Estimates Tomatoes Potatoes Rice
0 Cointegration vector β 1.329 1.133 1.259
(Standard errors) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
2 ρ1 -0.108 -0.060 -0.015
(Standard errors) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009)
ρ2 -0.083 -0.056 -0.033
(Standard errors) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
3F - t e s t  (ρ1=ρ2=0) 40.235 59.975 38.534
4.1 F-test (ρ1=ρ2) 1.459 52.695 54.284
(p-value) (0.227) (0.000) (0.000)
4.2 Ljung-Box statistic (1) 0.016 0.026 0.003
(p-value) (0.901) (0.871) (0.960)
Ljung-Box statistic (7) 5.957 0.264 9.901
(p-value) (0.545) (1.000) (0.194)
Ljung-Box statistic (14) 10.203 5.875 17.760
(p-value) (0.747) (0.970) (0.218)
Note: Null hypothesis of the Ljung-Box (q): First q autocorrelations of the residuals
are jointly equal to zero. The Critical values for F-test (ρ1=ρ2=0) are 3.04, 3.75 and
5.36 for 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. See Enders and Granger (1998)
Products
 
Recall that the first three steps of Hansen and Seo (2002) are related to setting the 
grid for β and γ and finding their values that maximize the likelihood function
12. Those 
optimal values are reported in Table 4. In Step III, the point estimate of γ is different 
from zero. Even though Hansen and Seo did not provide a way to compute the standard 
deviations of this parameter the indicator function dt=1(wt-1≤γ) could differ substantially 
for various values of γ. Furthermore, in the case of tomato, when γ=0 the mean value for 
dt, i.e. the proportion of observations in the first regime, is around 0.56, while when γ=-
                                                 
12 I used Johansen MLE as a consistent estimator for β and set the trimming parameter θ0=0.05.   16
0.308 as reported in Table 4, the mean is around 0.09. Hansen and Seo (2002) found 
similar skewed regimes when applied to the term structure of interest rates. This 
alternative estimation of γ obtained from the data is generating very different regimes 
than when assuming γ=0 a priori as in Enders and Granger (1998)
13.  
Table 4
Tests for threshold cointegration: Hansen - Seo
Step Estimates Tomatoes Potatoes Rice
III Cointegration vector β 1.558 1.174 0.742
Threshold parameter γ -0.308 0.119 0.233
V SupLM test 27.620 18.614 24.071
Fixed Regressor 26.571 25.607 26.278
(p-value) (0.046) (0.464) (0.116)
Residual Bootstrap 27.565 27.374 26.202
(p-value) (0.050) (0.548) (0.138)
Note: The grid search for β and γ was performed over 100 gridpoints for each
parameter. The Bootstrap values were computed with 500 simulation replications.
The null hypothesis for the SupLM test is no threshold effects.
Products
 
Step IV corresponds to the estimation of the VECM parameters. I will focus first on 
the test for threshold cointegration. In Step V, I reject the null hypothesis of no threshold 
cointegration for tomatoes and fail to reject for potatoes and rice. These results support 
the hypothesis that the more perishable products will display more asymmetric 
adjustments.  
Table 5 shows the VECM estimates for tomatoes in the presence of threshold 
cointegration
14. The parameters do not change much between regimes, mostly because 
                                                 
13 Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that γ=0 is "far" from maximizing the likelihood function. 
14 The VECM estimation for the other products is available upon request.   17
they are statistically equal to zero, but Hansen and Seo (2002) recommend that since 
there is no formal distribution theory for these estimates and their standard errors "the 
results should be interpreted somewhat cautiously" (p. 311). 
Table 5
Vector Error-Correction Model: Tomatoes
Variables Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2
Intercept -0.043 -0.001 -0.021 0.001
(0.035) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002)
Wt-1 -0.195 -0.081 -0.047 0.007
(0.082) (0.010) (0.079) (0.011)
∆ Retail price t-1 -0.042 -0.125 -0.037 0.008
(0.147) (0.037) (0.155) (0.028)
∆ Retail price t-2 0.180 -0.012 0.219 -0.041
(0.143) (0.025) (0.242) (0.025)
∆ Wholesale price t-1 -0.049 -0.006 -0.343 -0.053
(0.100) (0.034) (0.128) (0.045)
∆ Wholesale price t-2 -0.017 -0.022 -0.114 0.021
(0.112) (0.027) (0.099) (0.030)
Obs. in Regime 1 (%) 8.6
Obs. in Regime 2 (%) 91.4
No. Observations 1847
Log Likelihood -9934.2
Hypothesis Wald test P-value
    Equality of Autoregressive coefficients 7.03 0.534
    Equality of Error Correction coefficients 1.95 0.378
Note: Eicker-White standard errors in parenthesis.
Regime 1: Wt-1<=-0.308, Regime 2: Wt-1>-0.308
∆ Retail price t ∆ Wholesale price t
Dependent Variables
 
Notice that the adjustments to the long run equilibrium are driven more through the 
retail prices than the wholesale prices. The error-correction has minimal effects on 
∆Wholesalet in both regimes and on ∆Retailt in the first regime; the parameter is on the 
borderline of statistical significance, but this is not the case in the second regime. The   18
dynamics are minimal too. The authors found similar behavior in their applications. This 
would suggest that prices changes are close to a white noise process, so the prices in 
levels are close to random walks with no drift, at least for wholesale prices. 
Finally, following Ward (1982), this paper argues that the reasons to find 
asymmetric price responses in perishable goods is that agents in possession of these 
products may decide not to increase their prices for fear of being left with a spoiled 
product. I argue that if that is the case when wholesale prices increase we should expect a 
less than proportional increment in retail prices, or a lagged increment, or even no 
changes at all. When, on the other hand, wholesale prices decrease, we should expect a 
faster or bigger increment creating an asymmetric adjustment. Figure 2 shows these 
patterns. 
   19
Figure 2 plots the predicted values of ∆Wholesalet and ∆Retailt as a function of wt-1 
using the parameter reported in Table 5, holding all the autoregressive variables constant. 
First, as discussed above, in both regimes the parameters associated to the (lagged) error-
correction are not statistically significant different from zero in the regressions for 
∆Wholesalet. Thus, the dotted line should be seen as "flat". Second, Table 5 shows that in 
the first regime for ∆Retailt, the adjustments to the equilibrium are barely significant
15, so 
the retail price response when wt-1≤-0.308 is close to zero. This is not the case in the 
second regime where the t-test is -8.17. Notice also that the second regime (wt-1>-0.308) 
retail prices decrease as shown in Figure 2. That means that if at t=1, ceteris paribus, the 
wholesale price of tomatoes is above the long-run equilibrium relation (i.e., where in 
regime 1) the retail price of tomatoes at t=2 will remain similar to its level at t=1. But 
when at t=1 wholesale is below the long-run equilibrium relation (regime 2) retail price 
will decrease significantly at t=2. These different changes describe an asymmetric 
adjustment. In the case of less perishable products (potatoes and rice) I found no evidence 
of asymmetric behavior. 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper tests for asymmetric price adjustment in Peruvian agricultural markets. 
The major difference with respect to the previous literature is the intention of relating the 
existence of possible asymmetries to theories predicting such behavior. Most papers 
testing for nonlinear price adjustments fail to provide the corresponding empirical 
support to explain such behavior. The theories invoked by these papers rest their analysis 
on variables that are complicated to measure, such as oligopolies' coordination policies, 
                                                 
15 The fact the sample is large here (1847 observation) requires the use stricter significance levels.   20
market imperfections or menu costs. Attempts to relate rough measures of these variables 
failed to show a significant correlation with asymmetric responses as reported in 
Peltzman (2000). This lack of identification about the causes of such asymmetries leaves 
policy makers with no instruments to correct them. 
In this paper I relate asymmetric price responses to a theory of behavior under risk 
driven by the perishable rate of the goods. Ward (1982) argues that retailers of these 
products may decide not to increase their prices for fear of being left with a spoiled 
product. I found empirical evidence that can support this idea. Using three agricultural 
products that differ in their perishable rate I found evidence of asymmetric price 
adjustments to the long-run equilibrium in the case of tomatoes (the most perishable good 
in the sample) but not for the less perishable goods (potatoes and rice). 
To test for these asymmetries I used threshold cointegration techniques, but where 
the cointegration vector and the threshold parameter are estimated from the data instead 
of being arbitrarily chosen by the econometrician.  
The results presented in this paper can be extended to more products in order to 
have a more accurate identification of the relation between the risk induced by trading 
with perishable goods and the nonlinear price adjustments. Also, the technique used here 
needs a distribution theory for the parameters estimated as discussed in Hansen and Seo 
(2002). Finally, assuming the existence of only one threshold parameter and therefore 
only two regimes could be quite restrictive. It might be more adequate to estimate the 
VECM described in equation (5) in a semi-parametric way or in a nonlinear way as under 
the conditions described by De Long (2001). However, in both cases, the cointegration 
vector needs to be known ex-ante.   21
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Appendix 
Table A.1
F-test. Null hypothesis: no seasonal effects
Product Price F-test p-value
Tomato Retail 27.65 0.000
Wholesale 24.93 0.000
Potato Retail 5.64 0.000
Wholesale 7.14 0.000
Rice Retail 2.11 0.017
Wholesale 15.27 0.000
Note: Each variable was regressed against a constant and 11 seasonal dummies.  
 
 